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keeping all of the money for themselves to giving all of it away, and 
any division in between. Once the offer is made, the Responder must 
decide to either accept or reject the proposal. If the offer is accepted, 
then the money is simply divided as suggested. However, if the offer 
is rejected, then neither player receives any money. Both players are 
fully aware of the rules of the game, and once the Responder makes 
a decision the game is over.
Many studies across a multitude of disciplines and utilizing a 
variety of methods have examined social decision-making using 
the Ultimatum Game, and the behavioral results are generally 
strikingly similar (Camerer, 2003). Contrary to classical predic-
tions, which suggest that Responders should accept any non-zero 
offer and as a consequence Proposers should make the lowest 
offer possible, the modal offer to Responders is typically a little 
less than half of the total pot, and this amount is almost always 
accepted. Offers of around 30% of the pot are accepted only 
about half of the time, and acceptance rates diminish as offers 
get lower.
One suggested mechanism as to why responders turn down 
what is in effect ‘free’ money when rejecting low offers is that 
people severely dislike inequity (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and 
consequently feel anger in response to unfair offers (Pillutla and 
Murnighan, 1996; Xiao and Houser, 2005). There is compelling 
physiological evidence supporting this argument. Unfair offers 
INTRODUCTION
Despite its relative youth, neuroeconomics as a ﬁ  eld has made 
 signiﬁ  cant progress in describing the neural mechanisms that 
underlie decision-making (Glimcher et al., 2009). One approach 
within this domain has focused on circumstances in which the 
participant must consider the desires and intentions of another 
agent in reaching his or her eventual decision (Sanfey, 2007). 
These interactive situations have examined decisions made in a 
social environment, such as whether to trust or not trust another 
player or how to negotiate the division of a sum of money with 
another. The simplicity of these tasks and their ease of quan-
tiﬁ  cation provide not only a useful framework for developing 
mathematical models of optimal behavior within a social inter-
action (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Rabin, 1993; 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007), but 
also a controlled environment within which to understand how 
social interaction interacts with more general cognitive processes 
such as memory.
One commonly used task in this domain is the Ultimatum 
Game (Guth et al., 1982). In this simpliﬁ  ed bargaining scenario, 
one player known as the Proposer is endowed with a sum of money 
and told that their task is to make a proposal to the other player, 
the Responder, as to how this money should be divided between 
the two. The Proposer can make any offer he or she wants, from 
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are associated with increased autonomic tone (van ’t Wout et al., 
2006) and increased activity in the anterior insula (Sanfey et al., 
2003). In fact, greater insula activity in response to an unfair offer 
results in an increased likelihood of   rejection of that offer (Sanfey 
et al., 2003). Other studies have found that when neural systems 
involved in emotion regulation are disrupted in various ways, from 
using tryptophan depletion (Crockett et al., 2008) to lesions of 
the  ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007), the 
result is increased rejection rates of unfair offers.
Though the response to fair and unfair offers provides an 
  interesting window into how the competing motivations of 
  maintaining one’s reputation and maximizing one’s ﬁ  nancial 
gain interact in decision-making, other relevant questions can be 
answered using these type of tasks. Of perhaps equal importance 
to examining the processes that underlie performance in this task 
is to ask what happens, both behaviorally and neurally, when we 
re-encounter a player who has made a fair or unfair offer to us 
in the past. How do our perceptions of others shift when these 
people have previously treated us either well or poorly? In this 
initial attempt to investigate this question, we focus on memory 
for players with whom we have recently interacted, and speciﬁ  cally 
examine whether the way in which another player has treated us 
has an impact on how we in turn remember them.
Several theoretical proposals have been made as to whether we 
are more attuned to remembering those who have treated us either 
fairly or unfairly in the past. In their highly inﬂ  uential theory of 
social exchange, Cosmides and Tooby (1992) argue that humans 
have evolved speciﬁ  c cognitive abilities to   promote   reciprocal 
  altruism, a construct that has been associated with   positive 
 evolutionary   ﬁ  tness  (Trivers, 1971). Of particular   importance 
to their theory is the   ability to detect, remember, and punish 
  “cheaters” –   individuals  who beneﬁ  t themselves by violating a 
social contract (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992). However, despite the 
intuitive appeal of this theory, the primary evidence presented in 
favor of the selective   detection of cheaters is that experimental 
participants demonstrate improved conditional reasoning when 
asked to detect violations of a social   contract, when compared to 
non-social contract violations (Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer and 
Hug, 1992). Evidence supporting these theoretical claims in the 
domain of memory is more mixed.
Several studies have directly examined explicit memory for 
 cheaters. There is some evidence that after 1 week participants had 
better memories for pictures of people with behaviors associated 
with cheating (e.g. “E.A. is a bishop who was caught embezzling 
money from his own church.”) as compared to pictures of those 
that were associated with trustworthy behaviors (e.g. “J.H. is a 
vendor at   baseball games who, after ﬁ  nding a wallet containing 
$250, located the owner using the driver’s license.”) (Mealy et al., 
1996; Chiappe et al., 2004). However, more recent studies that 
have attempted to address some of the methodological limitations 
of these experiments have failed to replicate this ﬁ  nding, with no 
differences between cheaters and trustworthy pictures emerging 
(Barclay and Lalumiere, 2006; Mehl and Buchner, 2008). There is 
even some  preliminary  evidence for increased conﬁ  dence, though 
not accuracy, in   remembering altruists (Barclay and Lalumiere, 
2006), and also that people may have better source memory than 
recognition  memory for cheaters, meaning that people were  better 
at remembering that an individual was a cheater than actu-
ally   correctly identifying that they had seen the person before 
(Buchner et al., 2009).
One explanation of these mixed ﬁ  ndings is that the memory 
manipulations used were not particularly socially relevant for 
the participants. As outlined above, these paradigms typically 
involve participants reading a vignette describing either a  cheating 
or   trustworthy act by a pictured person, and then subsequently 
  performing a recognition memory test on the set of photographs. 
There are surprisingly few studies that have attempted to have 
 participants ﬁ  rst actually engage in meaningful social interactions 
with other people, and then test their memory for these partners. 
In one study with a variant of this methodology, participants 
were asked to imagine playing a constant strategy (i.e. cooperate 
or defect) in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and were then shown 
pictures and the strategies of their partners (Oda, 1997). After 
being tested 1 week later, the experimenters found that participants 
remembered defectors better than cooperators and that this effect 
interacted with gender. However, there was no clear explanation 
of the interaction with gender, nor was it clear that participants 
were actually engaged in the game as they were forced to stick with 
the same strategy.
Within neuroeconomics, there is clear evidence that people 
use information about a partner’s history to inform decisions in 
future social interactions, such as to avoid trusting a cheater in a 
 subsequent interaction or to punish them if given the opportunity. 
People are more likely to invest trust in partners perceived to be 
  initially   trustworthy as opposed to untrustworthy (Delgado et al., 
2005; van ’t Wout and Sanfey, 2008), and also seem able to then 
disregard this prior information when these partners actually abuse 
their trust. There is also evidence supporting the notion that people 
are willing to punish cheaters, even at the risk of incurring a ﬁ  nan-
cial cost to themselves in Ultimatum (Guth et al., 1982) and Public 
Goods Games (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; de Quervain et al., 2004). 
While these ﬁ  ndings suggest that people can learn both who to trust 
and who not to trust and will punish cheaters given the opportunity, 
there is as yet no conclusive evidence directly supporting better 
explicit memory for either cheaters or cooperators.
One study (Singer et al., 2004) attempted to   investigate this 
question both behaviorally and neurally by scanning  participants 
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) as they 
viewed faces which had previously behaved in either cooperative or 
non- cooperative ways in a modiﬁ  ed repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game. Behaviorally, the authors report that cooperators were rated 
as more likeable and defectors as less likeable than control faces. In 
addition, participants were more accurate in recalling the behavior 
of both cooperators and defectors as compared to the null games. 
However, because there was neither money at stake for the null 
games nor an equal distribution of trials for each condition, the 
results of this forced choice memory task should be interpreted 
cautiously. In terms of neural ﬁ  ndings, the authors reported that 
when asked to make a gender assessment of pictures of  cooperators 
as compared to those who played null games,   participants had 
increased activity in the left ventral putamen and left amygdala. In 
contrast, when participants viewed pictures of defectors compared 
to null trials, they showed increased activity in the vmPFC. These 
preliminary ﬁ  ndings suggest that viewing faces of defectors and Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  October 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 36  |  3
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cooperators from a socially relevant task may be   associated with 
distinct neural systems. However, it remains an open question as 
to whether or not there may be selectively better explicit memory 
for cheaters and what processes might underlie this.
A possible mechanism that could explain the aforementioned 
pattern of results is the notion of deviation from expectation, that 
is, when partners play in a way differently than we predict. While it 
is known that alterations of expectation can affect decision-making 
in the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey, 2009), up to now there has been 
relatively little investigation of how expectations, and speciﬁ  cally 
deviation from expectations, can alter patterns of memory in social 
decision-making.
Some limited evidence comes from a recent study using the Trust 
Game, which found that participants did not have  selective memory 
for either cooperators or defectors per se, but rather   demonstrated 
enhanced memory for both types of opponents in certain 
 circumstances, these circumstances being that the  better–remembered 
opponent played a relatively infrequent strategy. That is, at different 
times they remembered both cheaters and   defectors better, but only 
when they comprised merely 20% of the total number of interactions 
(Barclay, 2008). It is important to note that participants in this experi-
ment knew a priori that they were playing with computer partners, 
so it is not clear if these results could be generalized to games played 
with real opponents. Nonetheless, this study provides compelling 
evidence that people may have enhanced memory for partners that 
behave contrary to social conventions, regardless of their behavior. 
This suggests therefore that people may not rely on a speciﬁ  c cheater 
detection system, but rather a more general expectation violation 
system – a notion within the ﬁ  eld of memory that has been known 
for some time (von Restorff, 1933; Ranganath and Rainer, 2003), 
often discussed in this literature as a “novelty detection” mechanism. 
It is therefore possible that a more general novelty detection system 
can potentially be employed as a cheater detection system. Because 
interactions with cheaters in the real world are likely to be relatively 
infrequent, the expectation of cheating behavior should be low and 
as a result incidences of   cheating should be particularly memorable. 
However, importantly, if we do expect substantial cheating behavior in 
our environment, this account would predict that partners who treat 
us well should be preferentially encoded and remembered.
We sought to investigate this question by using fMRI to scan 
the brains of participants immediately after they played a series of 
Ultimatum Games with a variety of partners. Firstly, we  examined 
if our participants demonstrated more accurate memories for 
  partners that had treated them either fairly (an equal offer) or 
unfairly (an unequal offer in the partner’s favor). Secondly, we 
were particularly interested in the neural response to viewing a 
 photograph of a previous partner as compared to a photograph of 
a previously unseen person, and whether the offer that had been 
made to the participant mediated this neural activity in our par-
ticipants. Contrary to most prior behavioral studies of memory 
for cheaters, players in this study engaged in an actual social deci-
sion interaction and we directly assessed their social memory while 
they were being scanned using a standard recognition task. This 
study therefore can potentially inform an ongoing debate about 
whether people actually have enhanced memory for cheaters, and 




Eighteen  participants  (mean  age = 19.9,  female = 56%)  were 
recruited via advertisements posted on the campus of the University 
of Arizona to participate in this study. All participants were screened 
for any signiﬁ  cant health-related or neuropsychiatric disorders 
and none were currently taking psychoactive medication. Two 
  participants were excluded from the analysis for technical reasons 
(corrupted data). All participants gave informed consent according 




Prior to being scanned, we elicited participants’ beliefs about 
the kinds of offers they expected to encounter, with participants 
being asked the number of people out of 100 that they believed 
would make a $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, or $7 offer. Participants’ 
  elicited expectations prior to playing the game were used to   create 
a   distribution of the frequency of offers that they expected to 
encounter. The mode of this distribution was used to represent 
each participant’s initial expectation.
Ultimatum game
Participants then played a standard single-shot Ultimatum 
Game in the role of Responder with 48 different partners while 
  undergoing fMRI. Twenty-four of these partners were human, 
12 were   computers, and 12 were non-intentional humans (i.e. 
humans whose responses were randomly generated). Each offer 
was preceded by a picture of their partner for that round. Though 
participants were told that the human-intentional offers would be 
made by other players, in actual fact all offers were   controlled by 
the experimenter, and all participants saw the same set of offers. 
This set consisted of equal numbers (12 each) of $1, $2, $3 and $5 
offers, all of which were made from a $10 pot. For each participant, 
all pictures were randomly paired to an offer amount, ensuring 
that there was no potential picture by offer amount interaction. 
Participants were paid $20 for participating and an additional $5, 
which they believed was based on their performance in the game. 
Further details of the Ultimatum Game portion of the experiment 
will be described in greater detail in a separate paper. While partici-
pants were not directly queried after the experiment about whether 
or not they believed that they were   interacting with real partners, 
no   participant expressed doubt towards the experimenter at any 
time during the experiment.
Memory experiment
After completing the Ultimatum Game trials, participants were 
given an incidental memory test while undergoing fMRI (see 
Figure 1 for a trial timeline). Participants had not been forewarned 
about this task. Participants viewed randomly presented pictures 
of the 24 human-intentional partners they had previously encoun-
tered, as well as 24 new faces they had not seen in the Ultimatum 
Game task. Participants did not view pictures of the computers or 
the non-intentional human partners. There were an equal number 
of male and female faces for both the new and old sets of faces. 
To begin each trial, a jittered ﬁ  xation was seen for 6 s on average Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  October 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 36  |  4
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and then a face was shown for 4 s. After being presented with this 
photograph, participants were asked to rate their conﬁ  dence that 
they had played the Ultimatum Game with this person on a scale 
of 1 to 5 (1 = “I’ve deﬁ  nitely never seen this person before; 2 = “I 
don’t think I’ve seen them before”; 3 = “I’m not sure if I’ve seen 
this person before”; 4 = “I think I may have seen them before”; 
5 = “I’ve deﬁ  nitely seen this person before”). Participants were given 
8 s to make this judgment, and ratings were entered by scrolling 
through the possible options with one response button and then 
selecting the desired rating with the other button. While the rat-
ing system was always the same (e.g. 1 = never seen; 5 = deﬁ  nitely 
seen), the ratings randomly scrolled up or down on each trial to 
eliminate any possible motor confounds. Therefore, the number 
of button presses were orthogonal to the actual ratings provided. 
Stimuli were presented via EPrime software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Inc, Pttsburgh, PA, USA) using MRI-compatible googles and 
responses were recorded using a ﬁ  ber optic button box (Resonance 
Technologies, Van Nuys, CA, USA).
ANALYSES
All behavioral statistics were computed using the R statistical 
package (R_Development_Core_Team, 2008). For regressions that 
included repeated observations, we used the lme4 mixed effects 
general linear model package (Bates et al., 2008). Participants 
were treated as a random effect with  varying  intercepts and slopes. 
We report the parameter estimates (b), standard error, t-values, 
and p-values. Because there is no   generally agreed upon method 
for calculating p-values in mixed models, we used two separate 
methods. First, we calculated the degrees of freedom by subtract-
ing the number of observations minus the number of ﬁ  xed effects 
(Kliegl et al., 2007). Second, we generated conﬁ  dence intervals 
from the posterior distribution of the   parameter estimates using 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (Baayen et al., 2008). These 
results were identical unless otherwise noted. For robust regres-
sions we used the rlm function from the MASS package using an 
MM-estimator (Venables and Ripley, 2002).
D′
To measure participant’s ability to discriminate old from new faces, 
we used D′, a signal detection metric (Wickens, 2002). D′ controls 
for individual participants’ response bias (i.e. their propensity to say 
yes) and was calculated as the difference between the standardized 
z-score for hits (indicated by a 4 or 5 on the conﬁ  dence rating for an 
old face) and the standardized z-score for false positives (indicated 
by a 4 or 5 on the conﬁ  dence rating for a new face). Because this 
analysis emphasizes hits and false positives, it ignores differences 
in levels of subjective conﬁ  dence, that is, the difference between a 
1 and 2, or a 4 or 5 rating. D′ scores were calculated separately for 
every level of offer amount.
Data acquisition
Each scanning session included a T1-weighted MPRAGE struc-
tural  scan  (TR = 11 ms,  TE = 4 ms,  matrix = 256 × 256,  slice 
thickness = 1 mm, gap = 0 mm), followed by ﬁ  ve functional runs. 
The ﬁ  rst 3 functional runs contained the Ultimatum Game tri-
als and the last two contained the memory trials (240 volumes 
per run). Functional scans used a 3-shot multiple echo planar 
  imaging (MEPI) GRAPPA sequence using parameters selected 
to   maximize signal in regions associated with high susceptibil-
ity   artifact, such as orbitofrontal cortex and medial temporal 
lobe (Stocker et al., 2006; Weiskopf et al., 2006) (TR = 2000 ms, 
TE = 256 ms,  matrix = 96 × 96,  FOV = 192 mm,  slice  thick-
ness = 3.0 mm, 42 axial slices, voxel size 2 × 2 × 3). The MEPI 
sequence employs   parallel imaging and allows for increases in 
FIGURE 1 | Timeline of memory experiment. Participants ﬁ  rst viewed a jittered ﬁ  xation that was on average 6 s long before seeing each face. Participants saw 24 
photographs of previous partners in the Ultimatum Game and 24 new people for 4 s. Participants were then asked to rate their level of conﬁ  dence that the face was 
either new or old on a 5 point rating scale.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  October 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 36  |  5
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signal intensity, image   resolution, the number of slices that can 
be acquired in a 2000-ms TR, as well as substantial decreases in 
geometric distortion (Newbould et al., 2007).
Data preprocessing
Functional imaging data were preprocessed and analyzed using the 
FSL Software package 4.1.4 (FMRIB, Oxford, UK). The ﬁ  rst three 
volumes of the functional runs were discarded to account for T1 
equilibrium effects. Images were corrected for slice scan time using an 
ascending interleaved procedure. Head motion was corrected using 
MCFLIRT using a 6-parameter rigid-body transformation. Images 
were spatially smoothed using a 5 mm full width at half maximum 
Gaussian kernel. A high pass ﬁ  lter was used to cut off temporal peri-
ods longer than 66 s. All images were initially co-registered to the par-
ticipant’s high resolution structural scan and were then co-registered 
to the MNI 152 person 2-mm template using a 12-parameter afﬁ  ne 
transformation. All functional analyses are overlaid on the partici-
pants’ average high resolution structural scan in MNI space.
General imaging analysis methods
A 3-level mixed effects general linear model (GLM) was used to 
analyze the imaging data. A ﬁ  rst-level GLM was deﬁ  ned for each 
participant’s functional run that included a boxcar regressor for 
each epoch of interest (e.g. face phase), convolved with a  canonical 
double-gamma hemodynamic response function. To account for 
residual variance we also included the temporal  derivatives of each 
regressor of interest, the six estimated head movement parameters, 
and any missed trials as covariates of no interest. The resulting 
GLM was corrected for temporal   autocorrelations using FILM 
 prewhitening.  A  second-level  ﬁ  xed effects model was ﬁ  t for each 
participant to account for intra-run variability. For each  participant, 
contrasts were calculated between predictors for  different  regressors 
of interest at every voxel in the brain. A one-sample t-test was used 
at the third-level for each contrast using a Bayesian  implementation 
of mixed effects inference (Behrens et al., 2008). We corrected for 
multiple comparisons with cluster correction utilizing Gaussian 
random ﬁ   eld theory with an initial cutoff of Z >  2.3 and a 
FWE p < 0.05.
We report the results of three analyses. The offer amount analysis 
included individual regressors during the face phase for players who 
had previously made offers of $1, $2, $3, or $5, a regressor indicat-
ing the duration of the response time during the memory phase, a 
regressor indicating a distractor face, a regressor for missed trials, 
the temporal derivatives of each of these predictors and 6 motion 
parameters (20 predictors total). We report the results for the Unfair 
(i.e. $1 and $2 offers) vs Fair (i.e. $5) contrast. For the expecta-
tion violation analysis we included regressors at the face phase 
for offers below expectation (i.e. standardized expectation error 
(SEE) > 0), offers above expectation (i.e. SEE < 0), and offers at 
expectation (i.e. SEE = 0). SEE is the within-subject z-score of the 
numerical deviation of an offer amount from a participant’s ini-
tial expectations. In addition, we included a regressor modeling 
the memory phase for the duration of the response, a regressor 
indicating a distractor face, a regressor modeling missed trials, and 
their temporal derivatives and 6 motion parameters (18 predictors 
total). We report a linear contrast of prediction error (i.e. +1 0 −1) 
for Positive, Zero, and Negative SEE regressors. Finally, the third 
analysis was identical to the second analysis except the third level 
linear contrast was weighted by each participant’s standardized 
initial expectation, effectively utilizing a correlation analysis rather 
than a one sample t-test. This analysis tests the interaction between 
participant’s initial expectation and their SEE. All trials in which 
the participants indicated that they were unsure (i.e. a rating of 3) 





Consistent with previous research (Sanfey et al., 2003; van ’t Wout 
et al., 2006; Harle and Sanfey, 2007), acceptance rates decreased 
as offers got lower, and participants were signiﬁ  cantly more likely 
to accept fair ($5) as opposed to unfair ($1; $2) offers, illustrated 
using a mixed effects logit model (Jaeger, 2008), b = 4.24, se = 0.84, 
odds ratio = 69.21, Wald Z = 5.07, p < 0.05. The average acceptance 
rate for all intentional offers was 62.2%, with three participants 
accepting all offers. Consistent with previous research,  participants 
expected most participants to make fair offers (mean  =  4.5, 
sd = 0.63) (Sanfey, 2009).
Memory
A one-sample t-test revealed that participants were on average 
 accurate in their ability to discriminate between old and new faces 
(mean D′ = 2.04),  t(15) = 14.68,  p < 0.001.  Participants  were 
able to correctly identify both old faces (mean correct = 70%, 
se = 0.04) and new faces (mean correct = 76%, se = 0.04). We 
used a mixed effects linear model to test whether or not the 
amount of money offered by the proposer would inﬂ  uence par-
ticipant’s memory for that person, but did not observe a signiﬁ  -
cant effect, b = 0.03, se = 0.05, t = 0.52, ns. These results indicate 
that participants were sensitive in their ability to discriminate 
between new and old faces, but that, on average, this discrimi-
nability was not inﬂ  uenced by the amount of money offered by 
the partner.
However, closer examination of these results indicate that 
  participants demonstrated considerable variability in their   ability 
to remember proposers that made either fair or unfair offers 
(Figure 2). Some participants appeared to demonstrate improved 
memory for proposers that made unfair offers, while other 
 participants  remembered proposers that made fair offers  indicated 
by the  random effect slope coefﬁ  cient). Using robust regression we 
found that  participants’  initial expectations predicted the  random 
effects parameter estimates from the previous offer amount  analysis, 
  parameter estimate = 0.16, se = 0.04, t = 4.32, p < 0.05. This   analysis 
indicates that as initial expectations increased, the slope of offer 
amount on D′ decreased. In other words, participants with low 
initial  expectations had positive memory slopes, meaning that they 
  demonstrated augmented   memory for proposers that made fair 
offers, while  participants with high  initial  expectations had negative 
memory slopes, indicating increased   memory for   proposers that 
made unfair offers (Figure 2A).
To test this expectation violation hypothesis more   explicitly, 
we used a mixed effects linear model treating subjects as a ran-
dom   intercept. Speciﬁ  cally, we attempted to predict   participant’s Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  October 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 36  |  6
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 subjective  conﬁ   dence ratings using their centered initial 
  expectation, the   centered deviation of the offer amount from 
their initial   expectation, and the interaction between these two 
variables. We observed an initial expectation by expectation 
deviation   interaction, b = 0.17, se = 0.08, t = 2.21, p < 0.05, with 
no signiﬁ  cant main effects. Participants demonstrated enhanced 




As noted above, we observed no signiﬁ  cant effect of offer amount 
in predicting participant’s ability to discriminate between old and 
new faces. Similarly, for the corresponding imaging analysis, we 
did not observe any signiﬁ  cant voxels above threshold for this 
 previously fair vs. previously unfair contrast, even at a more liberal 
p < 0.001 (uncorrected) threshold. Therefore, at least on average 
across  participants, there is no particular neural signature for either 
previously fair or previously unfair partners.
Expectation violation
Our more detailed behavioral analysis indicated that expectation 
violation, and not offer amount, was associated with enhanced 
subsequent memory for partners. To explore the neural systems 
underlying this effect we ran two separate imaging analyses. 
The ﬁ  rst analysis examined the effect of expectation deviation. 
This contrast was associated with bilateral anterior insula, 
pre-  supplementary motor area (pre-SMA)/anterior cingulate 
  cortex (ACC), the   striatum (including the caudate and nucleus 
accumbens), and  bilateral  posterior hippocampi/parahippocampi. 
Negative   expectation deviations were associated with bilateral 
  temporal parietal junction (TPJ), right superior temporal sulcus 
(STS), posterior insula, and precuneus (see Figure 3). The second 
analysis examined the interaction between the initial expectation 
and the expectation error, by weighting the ﬁ  rst analysis by each 
participant’s standardized initial expectation at the third level. No 
voxels survived our threshold for this analysis. Thus, this set of 
analyses reveals a network previously associated with expectation 
violation (i.e. insula, pre-SMA, and NAcc), and memory retrieval 
(i.e. hippocampi/parahippocampi) when participants view faces of 
partners who offered more than the participants initially expected, 
and a network associated with theory of mind processing (i.e. STS/
TPJ) and memory (i.e. precuneus) when viewing partners that 
offered less than the participant initially expected (see Table 1 for 
a complete list of regions).
DISCUSSION
This study investigated how economic exchange impacts 
  subsequent memories for social partners. Following a standard 
Ultimatum Game paradigm, participants were shown photographs 
of both  previously seen and unseen people, and asked to rate their 
 conﬁ  dence that they had viewed these pictures before. This question 
is important in understanding the behavioral and neural effects of 
reappraising a partner with whom one has previously been engaged 
in social economic interaction. In addition, this research was also 
interested in investigating the notion of “cheater detection”, that is, 
the idea of relatively enhanced memories for social partners who 
have treated us badly in the past (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Mealy 
et al., 1996; Singer et al., 2004; Barclay, 2008).
We were primarily interested in whether participants  exhibited 
a relative memory enhancement for partners that made either fair 
or unfair proposals. A demonstration of the latter (i.e. enhanced 
memory for unfair proposers) would provide evidence  supporting 
the existence of behavioral cheater-detection effects. However, we 
FIGURE 2 | Behavioral results. (A) The effect of offer amount on D′ plotted in 
orange. The individual regression lines plotted in blue reveal considerable variability 
in discriminability by offer amount. Positive slopes indicate enhanced memory for 
partners that made fair offers, while negative slopes indicate enhanced memory 
for partners that made unfair offers. (B) The effect of initial expectation on 
individual memory parameter [i.e. the slopes from (A)]. The individual variability in 
memory for offer amounts is related to initial expectations. High initial 
expectations are associated with negative slopes (i.e. enhanced memory for 
partners that made unfair offers), while low initial expectations are associated with 
positive slopes (i.e. enhanced memory for partners that made fair offers). (C) The 
effect of expectation error on subjective conﬁ  dence ratings, split by initial 
expectations (groupings are only for plotting, not analysis). High initial expectations 
(orange) demonstrated enhanced memory for offers that were less than their 
initial expectation. Low initial expectations (dark blue) were associated with 
enhanced memory for partners that made offers that exceeded their expectations. 
No relationship was found for medium initial expectations (light blue).Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  October 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 36  |  7
Chang and Sanfey  Social memory following economic bargaining
did not observe a signiﬁ  cant effect, either behaviorally or  neurally, 
for an inﬂ  uence of offer fairness on memory. Instead, we found 
that participants demonstrated considerable variability in their 
ability to discriminate between partners associated with  different 
levels of fairness (e.g. some participants demonstrated relative 
enhanced memory for fair partners and some for unfair  partners). 
Importantly, this variability was predicted by their initial expec-
tations about the range of offers they would see in the game. 
Those who had low initial expectations (operationalized by their 
modal reported expected offer) were more likely to demonstrate 
augmented memory for partners that exceeded their expecta-
tions, while those who had high initial expectations demonstrated 
better memory for partners who made offers lower than their 
initial expectations. We also observed a signiﬁ  cant interaction 
between participants’ initial expectations and their expectation 
error (i.e. the   proposal’s   deviation from initial expectation) in 
predicting   subjective   conﬁ  dence ratings. Participants who had 
low initial expectations were more likely to remember partners 
that made offers that were greater than their initial expectations, 
while participants that had high initial   expectations were more 
likely to remember partners that made offers that were lower than 
their initial expectations.
This ﬁ  nding is consistent with the results of a recent cheater 
detection study (Barclay, 2008), in which   participants demon-
strated enhanced memory in a recognition test for   whichever 
behavior (e.g. cooperate or defect) was more   infrequent in 
a   previously-played Trust Game. When the majority of part-
ners cooperated, participants remembered defectors better, 
whereas when most partners defected, participants remembered 
 cooperators better. Our study employed a different approach than 
that of (Barclay, 2008), namely use of an Ultimatum as opposed 
to the Trust Game, and additionally we used the   participants 
own   expectations as the “baseline”, as opposed to examining 
violations from experienced probabilities, but the two sets of 
results converge on the same interpretation – that deviations 
from prior expectations result in greater salience and thus better 
memory encoding.
This conjecture has been posited for a long time in the memory 
literature dating to von Restorff (1933). The Von Restorff effect 
refers to memory enhancement occurring when an item is isolated 
either by manipulating the context (e.g. item is printed in red in a 
list of items printed in black) or content (e.g. inserting a nonsense 
syllable into a list of meaningful words) (Wallace, 1965). This effect 
is thought to be associated with unexpected change rather than 
FIGURE 3 | Brain regions associated with expectation violation. These 
results are a linear contrast of standardized expectation error (SEE) when 
participants are viewing pictures of their partners during the memory task. Yellow 
values are associated with partners that offered more than the participant’s initial 
expectation. Blue values are associated with viewing partners that offered less 
than the participant’s initial expectation. (A) Axial section shows bilateral insula, 
ventral striatum, bilateral posterior hippocampi, visual cortex associated with 
positive SEE, while right superior temporal sulcus and bilateral posterior insula 
are associated with negative SEE. (B) Coronal section shows bilateral anterior 
insula, ventral striatum, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and pre-
supplementary motor area/dorsal anterior cingulate. (C) Coronal section shows 
bilateral posterior hippocampus. (D) Right lateral section shows DLPFC, VLPFC, 
and TPJ and STS. (E) Sagittal section shows preSMA/DACC. (F) Sagittal section 
shows posterior hippocampus/parahippocampus. All clusters survive whole brain 
correction using cluster correction, Z > 2.3, p < 0.05 and are displayed on the 
group average T1 image using the radiological convention (left = right).Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  October 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 36  |  8
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Table 1 | Brain regions associated with expectation error.
Hemisphere Region  BA Z value  X Y  Z
POS > NEG
L Angular  gyrus  39  3.56  −46  −60 36
L Anterior  insula  48  3.15  −42 12  −4
L Frontal  operculum  48  3.04  −42 18 4
L Lateral  OFC  38  3.23  −38 18  −14
L  Midbrain (substantia nigra)  NA  3.76  −10  −14  −10
L Occipital  cortex  18  4.88  −34  −94 10
L  Occipital cortex (primary visual)  17  4.99  −6  −96 14
L Posterior  hippocampus  27  4.14  −20  −32  −4
L  Superior parietal lobule    7  3.6  −30  −58 42
L Temporal  pole  38  3.36  −50 14  −8
R ACC  24  3.73  2  20  36
R Anterior  insula  47  3.44  42  16  −8
R Fusiform  gyrus  37  5.03  38  −46  −24
R  Inferior frontal gyrus  48  3.55  54  18  20
R  Middle frontal gyrus  44  3.04  52  14  36
R Occipital  cortex  18  5.11  8  −96 20
R Parahippcampus  27  4.19  18  −34  −8
R Posterior  hippocampus  20  4.04  24  −26  −10
R Pre-SMA  32  3.84  4  20  44
R Cerebellum  (right  VI)  19  5.08  28  −68  −20
R  Superior frontal gyrus    8  3.31  0  36  50
R Temporal  pole  38  3.43  50  20  −20
NEG > POS
L Angular  gyrus  39  3.56  −46  −60 36
L Posterior  insula  48  3.01  −38  −12  −2
L Precuneus    7  3.22  −6  −60 52
L  Superior parietal lobule    5  3.17  −18  −60 66
L  Superior temporal gyrus  22  3.5  −62  −30 12
L STS  48  3.73  −48  −12  −8
L  Supramarginal gyrus anterior division (TPJ)  40  3.39  −62  −30 40
L  TPJ (parietal operculum cortex)  48  3.41  −58  −38 26
R Posterior  insula  20  3.79  40  −12  −10
R Precuneus    5  3.08  4  −48 60
R  Superior temporal gyrus  42  3.47  58  −34 16
R STS  22  3.5  62  −14  −6
R  Supramarginal gyrus posterior division (TPJ)  48  3.77  54  −36 28
R  TPJ (parietal operculum cortex)  48  3.79  62  −28 22
This table reﬂ  ects the contrast positive expectation error compared to negative expectation error and shows the local maxima of clusters surviving cluster correction 
Z > 2.3, p < 0.05 in MNI space. Cortical and subcortical regions were identiﬁ  ed using the Harvard-Oxford Probabilistic Anatomical Atlas and Mai et al. (2007), while 
the cerebellar regions were identiﬁ  ed using a probabilistic cerebellar atlas (Diedrichsen et al., 2009). Abbreviations: TPJ = temporal-parietal junction, SMA = supple-
mentary motor area, STS = superior temporal sulcus, OFC = orbitofrontal cortex, ACC = anterior cingulate cortex.
actual isolation (Green, 1956). The source of this mechanism has 
been the focus of considerable research in the memory, attention, 
and cognitive control literatures and has even served as one of 
the primary paradigms in studying cognition in preverbal infants 
(Fantz, 1964). Detecting novel stimuli embedded within more 
  frequent background stimuli has been extensively studied using a 
paradigm known as the “oddball task”. The ability to detect novel 
stimuli or expectation violations is associated with a distinct event 
related potential that occurs about 300 ms after the novel  stimulus 
onset (Sutton et al., 1965). While the precise neural origins of this 
signal are still being worked out (Ranganath and Rainer, 2003), 
the   hippocampus (Knight, 1996; Tulving et  al., 1996), ACC 
(Baudena et al., 1995; Berns et al., 1997), and insula (Linden et al., 
1999; Kiehl et al., 2001) have been shown to be reliably involved. 
Our ﬁ  ndings support the existence of this more general system 
that detects violations of expectations and, importantly, extends 
these ideas into the domain of social interactive decision-making 
and neuroeconomics.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  October 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 36  |  9
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In terms of our imaging results, we also found distinct  networks 
consistent with systems previously identiﬁ  ed with expectation 
violation and memory. Viewing faces of partners whose offers 
exceeded expectations was associated with bilateral posterior 
 hippocampi/parahippocampi, bilateral anterior insula, pre-SMA/
ACC, and   striatum. These regions have previously been associ-
ated with expectation violation, social cognition, and memory. 
Considerable research has demonstrated that posterior hip-
pocampal regions are critical in successful recognition memory 
(Eldridge et al., 2000; Yonelinas et al., 2005). In addition, patients 
with hippocampal damage have been demonstrated to have a 
selective impairment in generating the characteristic P300 and 
autonomic skin response   following unexpected events while the 
processing of expected events remained preserved (Knight, 1996). 
Our observed activation in the striatum, which included the cau-
date and nucleus accumbens is consistent with the literature on 
reward prediction error (Schultz et al., 1997) and repeated play 
with cooperators (Rilling et al., 2002). Partners that exceed initial 
expectations are associated with a  positive prediction error, which 
is likely to   promote further   cooperation with these partners in 
the future (Rilling et al., 2002; Delgado et al., 2005; King-Casas 
et al., 2005). We also observed activity in the pre-SMA area/ACC 
and bilateral anterior insula. This network appears to be func-
tionally coupled (Fox et al., 2005; Margulies et al., 2007; Craig, 
2009), and has   consistently been   associated with detecting viola-
tions of expectation in a multitude of contexts including stimu-
lus frequency (Braver et al., 2001), changes in sequences (Berns 
et al., 1997; Huettel et al., 2002) and multi-modal sensory changes 
(Downar et al., 2000). Thus,   viewing   pictures of partners who 
exceeded participants’ expectations resulted in increased   activity 
in regions of the brain that have been consistently associated with 
detecting violations of expectations in paradigms investigating 
more basic aspects of novelty detection and also in successful 
memory retrieval.
In contrast, when viewing partners that had made lower offers 
than the player had expected, we found activation in bilateral 
TPJ, right STS, bilateral posterior insula, and precuneus. These 
regions have been implicated in a variety of processes includ-
ing   memory, expectation violation, social cognition, and pain 
 processing. The TPJ has been shown to be involved in expectation 
violation (Downar et al., 2000) and plays a key role in generat-
ing the brain’s P300 novelty response (Knight et al., 1989) and 
in orienting   attention (Corbetta et al., 2000). In addition, the 
TPJ has received attention for its role in thinking about oth-
ers’ mental states (i.e. theory of mind) (Saxe and Kanwisher, 
2003), but it is currently unclear if these two processes can be 
explained by a more general cognitive process (Mitchell, 2008). 
Thus, viewing pictures of partners who offered less money than 
was expected is associated with a region of the brain that has 
been implicated in both social cognition and novelty detection. 
We also observed increased activity in the right STS, a region 
which has been hypothesized to detect and evaluate intentions 
and actions of other’s behavior (Frith and Frith, 1999; Saxe et al., 
2004). This region has been associated with updating expecta-
tions about an opponent’s strategy based on their behavior in a 
repeated Inspection game (Hampton et al., 2008). In addition, 
the STS and TPJ have been demonstrated to be involved in social 
prediction error – speciﬁ  cally in both making a prediction about 
the value of a social partner’s advice and updating this prediction 
after feedback (Behrens et al., 2008). We also observed activity 
in the bilateral posterior insula, which has been primarily asso-
ciated with interoceptive processing, that is   processing of the 
  physiological   condition of the body (Craig, 2002). This region 
is reliably   associated with processing pain from external stimu-
lation (Koyama et al., 2005; Singer et al., 2004) and also direct 
cortical  stimulation (Ostrowsky et al., 2002) and  suggests, at least 
  tentatively, that   viewing pictures of participants who offered 
less than   expectations is perhaps   associated with processing a 
  negative somato-visceral state. Finally, the precuneus has been 
demonstrated to be involved in memory, and social   cognition 
(Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). The range of these memory proc-
esses is diverse and includes  episodic memory retrieval (Shallice 
et al., 1994; Tulving et al., 1994),   recognition memory (Henson 
et al., 1999; Yonelinas et al., 2005), source memory (Lundstrom 
et al., 2005), and autobiographical memory retrieval (Addis et al., 
2004). The precuneus has also been involved in mentalizing per-
ceived intentionality (den Ouden et al., 2005), and in reason-
ing about another’s beliefs (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003). These 
results suggest that viewing a picture of a partner that offered 
less money than was initially expected is associated with brain 
regions that have been thought to be involved in processing nega-
tive somatic states, mentalizing about another person’s beliefs, 
updating expectations about behavior, and memory.
Interestingly, despite the methodological differences between 
the present study and that of Singer et al. (2004), both stud-
ies yield somewhat similar results. Singer et  al. (2004)had 
  participants repeatedly make a gender discrimination on pho-
tographs of  partners with whom they had previously encountered 
in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. In contrast, our study 
employed a  single-shot design using the Ultimatum Game and a 
recognition task that included an equal number of old and new 
faces. Our   imaging analyses focus on partners that made offers 
that were either higher or lower than the participant’s initial 
expectation, while Singer et al. (2004) independently compared 
partners that were cooperators or defectors to partner’s associ-
ated with null games. Despite these methodological discrepancies 
both studies identify the anterior insula and different compo-
nents of the striatum as being linked to partners with positive 
associations (i.e. cooperator or positive expectation error). While 
Singer et al. (2004) only found vmPFC associated with defectors, 
we observed activity in the posterior insula, STS, TPJ. Because 
our study was explicitly designed to study social memory, we 
were also able to observe activity in regions that have previ-
ously been associated with memory retrieval – most notably the 
hippocampal/parahippocampal regions and precuneus. Thus, 
our results extend those of Singer et al. (2004), by providing a 
different perspective on cheater detection (i.e. expectation vio-
lation) as well as methods that are more conducive to studying 
social memory.
In contrast to our behavioral results, we did not observe 
  activation in the brain for the interaction between initial expec-
tations and expectation error. One possible reason why we failed 
to observe a signiﬁ  cant ﬁ  nding for the imaging interaction is 
the combination of a stringent statistical threshold and a lack of Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  October 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 36  |  10
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statistical power. While our mixed effects procedure can account 
for unequal variances in the interaction analysis, there is an under 
representation of cases in which there are low initial expecta-
tions in this sample. Thus, while our behavioral analyses utilized 
a p-value of p < 0.05, our imaging analyses were restricted to a 
more stringent criteria to account for multiple comparisons. 
Indeed, when the statistical threshold is dropped to a more lib-
eral p < 0.005 uncorrected level, we ﬁ  nd almost identical results to 
our expectation error analysis including bilateral anterior insula, 
SMA, bilateral posterior  hippocampus, bilateral caudate, left ven-
tral putamen, and bilateral amygdala.
As noted, we did not observe any evidence for a signiﬁ  cant 
behavioral or imaging ﬁ  nding for enhanced memory for part-
ners based on the amount of money they offered. Nor did we 
observe evidence of a salience detection system, in which part-
ners who made either extremely fair or unfair offers were bet-
ter   remembered. The literature on cheater detection is rife with 
conﬂ  icting results, with some studies ﬁ  nding enhanced memory 
for cheaters (Mealy et al., 1996; Oda, 1997; Chiappe et al., 2004), 
others ﬁ   nding enhanced memory for altruists (Barclay and 
Lalumiere, 2006), and others, like the present study, ﬁ  nding no 
signiﬁ  cant differences (Barclay and Lalumiere, 2006; Mehl and 
Buchner, 2008). The more   general expectation deviation system 
outlined here is a potential   mechanism that could account for 
the inconsistent results in this domain. However, at present it is 
not immediately clear why we identiﬁ  ed two distinct expectation 
violation systems that track with the valence of the deviation. In 
addition, it is important to note that despite the attractiveness 
of the expectation violation hypothesis, our   imaging results do 
not necessarily rule out the possibility that some of the regions 
associated with negative expectation violations may be involved 
in cheater detection. Addressing these issues could be fruitfully 
explored further in future research.
Like all studies, there are a number of limitations that should 
be considered before drawing ﬁ  rm conclusions from the results. 
First, it is always difﬁ  cult to interpret null ﬁ  ndings. Our lack of 
signiﬁ  cant results for offer amount on memory cannot  necessarily 
be interpreted as an absence of an effect. Neuroimaging studies 
are inherently underpowered (Mumford and Nichols, 2008) and 
as such are greatly at risk for making Type II error. Second, it is 
unclear if participants actually believed they were engaged in 
a real social interaction. While participants were not explicitly 
probed about whether they believed that they were playing with 
a real partner, no participant expressed any doubt, nor did their 
  behavior   deviate remarkably from other published studies that 
utilized actual human partners (Camerer, 2003). In addition, con-
sistent with previous research (Sanfey, 2009), most   participants 
indicated that they expected their partners to make fair offers. 
Finally, it is somewhat of an open question as to whether a single 
UG interaction is sufﬁ  cient to label a partner as a “cheater”. It is 
possible that making such a judgment would require multiple 
interactions. However, a single interaction would be enough to 
develop an initial impression and there is   considerable evidence 
demonstrating that participants generate negative emotional 
responses in response to a single unfair offer (Sanfey et al., 2003; 
van ’t Wout et al., 2006).
In summary, our results support a more general system that 
detects violations of expectations as opposed to a more  specialized 
system engineered to detect cheaters. We found that participants on 
average were no better or worse at remembering partners who made 
either fair or unfair proposals, but rather that individual partici-
pants exhibited selectively better memory for partners who made 
offers which violated their initial expectations. Two   dissociable 
neural systems were found to be underlying this effect. While both 
systems have been previously associated with  expectation violation, 
social cognition, and memory, these regions tentatively suggest that 
there is distinct processing for positive and negative   expectation 
violations. Positive   expectation   violations are   associated with a 
  system that may incorporate error detection,   conscious   awareness 
of the error, reward processing, and enhanced   recognition 
  memory, while negative expectation   violations are associated 
with  expectation  violation,  evaluating intentions, pain  processing, 
and   autobiographical   episodic   memory.  By   incorporating  the 
strengths of several ﬁ  elds – the tasks of   behavioral economics, the 
  methodologies of   psychology and the sophisticated techniques of 
neuroscience – we can uniquely   investigate how social exchange 
operates, not just in terms of the immediate decisions but also how 
these interactions can   reverberate over time.
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